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Abstract—In this work, we present the process of identi-
fying potential vulnerabilities in 6LoWPAN enabled networks
through fuzzing. The 6LowPAN protocol has been designed by
the IETF as an adaptation layer of IPv6 for Low power and
lossy networks. The fuzzing process is build upon the Scapy
packets manipulation library. It provides different mutation
algorithms to be applied on 6LoWPAN protocol messages
to assess its implementations security and robustness. The
protocol behaviors are described using an XML format to
define different testing scenarios.
Keywords-vulnerability discovery; fuzzing; 6LoWPAN; wire-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The future Internet is an IPv6 network interconnecting
traditional computers and a large number of smart objects.
Smart objects are generally added to the Internet using
IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPAN) [1]. These networks are formed by devices that
are compatible with the IEEE 802.15.4 [2] standard as its
communication protocol for Medium Access Control (MAC)
layer and Physical (PHY) layer. IEEE 802.15.4 devices are
characterized by low computational power, scarce memory
capacity, lower bit rate, short range, and low cost. LoWPAN
have devices that work together and connect the physical
working environment to real-world applications like sen-
sors with wireless application. As node density in sensor
networks increases and these networks required connection
with other networks via internet, then Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) defines IPv6 over LoWPAN as techniques
to implement the TCP/IP protocol in WSNs. 6LoWPAN
provides a WSN node with IP communication capabilities
by putting an adaptation layer above the IEEE 802.15.4 link
layer for the packet fragmentation and reassembly purpose.
These networks have begun to take an important place in
our life, and they take control over important and private
information in intelligent houses and critical industrial fa-
cilities. Therefore, among many other issues, the challenge
of assessing the security in the IoT must be addressed. In
traditional Internet network-based fuzz testing has become
an effective way to ensure the security and reliability of
communication protocol systems. It is therefore reasonable
to explore this technique for IoT protocols [3].
Fuzzing is a highly automated technique [4] that covers
numerous boundary cases using invalid, unexpected or ran-
dom data as application input to better ensure the absence of
exploitable vulnerabilities. A fuzzer is able to perform hun-
dred of thousands or millions of testing iterations, covering
a significant number of interesting iterations permutations
for which it would be difficult to write individual test cases.
The application itself will react to these inputs reporting ex-
ceptions, crashes, failing in the normal behavior or keeping
the normal flow. The technique goal is find out unexpected
scenarios that lead to situations that escape from the normal
flow scenario and produce an unexpected behavior. Fuzzing
approach has been widely applied on several traditional
network protocols, services and document formats including
HTTP, FTP, SIP, PDF,XML, etc [5], [6]. It is a valuable
technique for automatic testing of protocol implementations
to improve their security and reliability. Identifying such
flaws is extremely important since they might be exploited
by malicious parties to launch attacks.
This paper presents a testing suite designed to enabled
6LoWPAN compliant device developers to test the security
and robustness of their protocol stack through fuzzing. The
fuzzer engine itself is built around the Scapy [7] packet
manipulation framework, to which we have added a module
that supports the assembly, disassembly and fuzzing of the
6LoWPAN protocol. It incorporates features for replicate
common interactions between devices, called scenarios, rep-
resented in a simple XML Language. Each scenario, defines
the sequence of packets to be sent, and how the fuzzed de-
vice should reply to these packets. The fuzzer also supports
the application of different mutation methods over created
scenarios. These mutation methods can be either predefined
where they are delivered as a library, or implemented directly
by the framework user. The fuzzer relies on an embedded
IEEE 802.15.4 driver for linux, that we have developed to
inject messages into the target network. In our current case,
the target is either the protocol itself or the application that
resides on a remote device. In this case, we are sending
messages through the network to test the target device’s
behavior.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II
details our fuzzing methodology of 6LoWPAN protocol
using an XML based format to describe its messages and
behaviors. Section III presents our fuzzing tool design and
implementation. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper and
presents our future work.
II. FUZZING METHODOLOGY
Network-based fuzzing requires the construction of inter-
action scenarios between the fuzzer and the target device
to select the best combination of packets which will most
probably generate a crash into the target device. The goal
is to replicate interactions between devices to apply fuzzing
algorithms in specific places in the communication process.
Thus, we are able to find several flaws hidden deeply in
the device implementation. We specified an XML-based
language to represent messages in an interaction process
for a testing scenario. The fuzzer is driven by these XML
scenarios that define the sequence of packets to be sent,
and how the fuzzed system should reply to these packets.
Using such approach, The fuzzer supports stateless and
stateful modes. In a stateless mode, only messages to be sent
are specified without taking into account their responses.
However, in a stateful mode, the scenario describes the entire
or a part of the protocol interaction including messages to
be sent and their respective responses. As depicted in Figure
1, the developer interacting with the fuzzer can then use the
provided mutation policies, or create new ones, and define
how to apply them to the selected scenario, and start fuzzing
the device.
Figure 1. The 6LoWPAN fuzzing framework.
A. Message specification
A message is a target protocol packet with a certain
predefined name and a set of parameters to be mutated. It is
a binary sequence hat should be sent through some network
interface to test certain behavior (modify a parameter, wait
for a specific response, etc...) in a device. In our approach,
the messages are usually generated with the scapy library
but they could be created from any binary sequence. As we
will explain in section III, we have extended scapy with
a 6LoWPAN layer to create all the messages required by
an interaction scenario. The messages will be contained in
a Python file that could be created manually or imported
from the wireshark tool. Every message should have a name
representable in a Python string. For example: message1,
1, 124124 are valid possibilities. Snippet 1 depicts a basic
6LoWPAN message that we have named message ping. It
has some special fields set and the unset parameters are filled
by scapy with default values.
Snippet 1 An example of building a 6LoWPAN message
using Scapy.
ping_msg = IPv6(dst="aaaa::11:22ff:fe33:4455", src
="aaaa::1")/ICMPv6EchoRequest()
packet = LoWPAN_IPHC(tf=0x0, _hopLimit=64)/
ping_msg
messages[’message ping’] = packet
We have shown a typical case of packet construction, but
there are other scapy features that we could take advantage
of them in the packet building process. One of these feature
is fuzzing specific fields. As depicted in Snippet 2, we are
able to set the sam field in the message ping as a random
value.
Snippet 2 An example of building a 6LoWPAN message
with a random value.
ping_msg = IPv6(dst="aaaa::11:22ff:fe33:4455", src
="aaaa::1")/ICMPv6EchoRequest()




messages[’message ping’] = packet
B. Scenario format
A scenario is an ordered sequence of packets that specify
clearly which message should be sent and what are the
expected responses. It specifies what should be done with
a packet: sent or wait for an answer through a given
interface (i.e. usb0, eth1, wlan15). The scenario itself re-
produces a communication between devices, specifying the
sent messages and the most important or all properties of the
expected responses. Also, the scenarios language allow us
to test some properties, to make basic packet manipulation
on-the-fly to be able to interact with the tested device
in unknown situations, or context depending situations. A
potential scenario could represent a ping interaction between
two devices, testing that the value sent in the data field of
the ICMP message is the same in the received message. As
well as we could modify the destination address on-the-fly
to make a more reusable scenario.
An XML structure has been defined to describe in-
teractions based on the 6LoWPAN Protocol behavior. We
have defined 3 different tags for this structure: scenario,
recv and send for the scenario itself, message sending and
message receiving respectively. Every tag should has its
own attributes and subtags. The scenario tag defines the
main properties, parameters and it contains the message’s
sequence. It includes the scenario’s name and the set of
messages to send and the expected messages to receive.
The send tag specifies a message that should be sent, the
message could be based on a previously created message
with Scapy or it could be created on-the-fly with some
hexadecimal code. The XML Format also offers a feature to
decide what type of packet should be sent: 6LoWPAN, IPv6
or IEEE 802.15.4. In addition, the send tag could contain
some subtags to modify a field on-the-fly by providing a
value previously calculated or a certain value set by the
user. The send tag includes the attributes: the name of the
message, the identifier of the message available in python
messages file, the packet type (6loWPAN, IPv6, 802.15.4),
the packet payload encoded in hexadecimal format. We have
to note that we only need to specify either the identifier of
the message or the payload. Each send tag specifies one or
multiple field subtag to modify field values of the packet.
The field tag defines the scapy layer where the field is
defined, its name, it value and its type.
The recv tag specifies an expected message to be received.
It mainly includes a timeout attribute to define the timeout
for receiving the message and one or multiple test subtags
to check specific received field’s values. Each test subtag
includes as attributes: the layer of the field, its name, its
value and type, an operation name to be applied on the
field value. We have defined several operations to check,
to modify or to assign a value of the field. Snippet 3 depicts
a basic scenario for sending a simple 6LoWPAN packet. In
this scenario, we modify on the fly the values of the fields
tf and dac. The message named basic 6lowpan has been
defined in the messages dictionary (a python data structure)
as follows:
messages[’basic_6lowpan’] = LoWPAN_IPHC()/IPv6()











A more advanced scenario is depicted in Snippet 4 to
describe a ping interaction between a host and a 6LoW-
PAN node. In this scenario, we used a message named
basic ping echo defined as a python variable in the mes-
sages dictionary.

























In [8], we have detailed more advanced scenarios and
usage examples.
III. 6LOWPAN FUZZER DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. System overview
Our fuzzing tool is implemented as a plugin-in to Scapy, a
framework for manipulating network packets. In particular,
it is based upon functionality from a decoding layer of
6LoWPAN packets. The fuzzer communicates with IoT
devices, through a 802.15.4 network interface connected the
to fuzzing platform which must be in range of the tested
devices, and must be capable of relaying raw Link Layer
frames. To be able to inject crafted 6LoWPAN packets into
the network, we used an Atmel RZUSBstick, a 802.15.4
USB dongle, running a modified version of the Contiki OS,
that simply relays packets without altering them. As we
explained in section II, the fuzzer engine is then driven
by a scenario written in XML that defines the sequence
of sent and received packets. It also uses a set of callback
functions written in python that define which messages and
message fields to alter, and how. The fuzzer engine provides
the following functionalities:
• Forge and decode IEEE 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN pack-
ets using an added module to the Scapy packet manip-
ulation framework.
• Apply different mutation algorithms on message bits
and fields.
• Define request/response based network scenarios in
XML.
• Execute XML-based interaction scenarios which define
fuzzed packets and fields, to allow 6LoWPAN appli-
cation or device developers to assess the robustness of
their implementations.
The overall architecture of the fuzzing engine is depicted in
Figure 2.
Parser
Figure 2. The fuzzing engine architecture.
The engine mainly relies on different modules which
are responsible for executing interaction scenario, applying
mutation algorithms over 6LoWPAN messages and checking
the status of the tested device. If the device is not responding,
it means that an existing vulnerability has been reached and
exploited. The executor module parses the sniffed packets
obtained through the USB dongle running a customized
contiki code. These packets are then queued to be analyzed,
their respective answers are generated and mutation are
applied according to the executed scenario.
B. 6LoWPAN messages decoding and injection
6LoWPAN [9], [10] has been defined as an encapsulation
and header compression mechanism that defines a set of
compression/decompression rules taking advantage of the
most common messages sent through a typical wireless
sensor network, and exploiting some features of the under-
laying layer, IEEE 802.15.4, and the upper layer, IPv6. Even
more, all the information that should be repeated is avoided
allowing the protocol to send really short messages and in
this way, helping the devices to save energy. The protocol
also has defined some special rules to fragment IPv6 long
messages. Being able in this way, to send the minimal length
IPv6 message.
1) 6LoWPAN message decoding: We have extended the
scapy library with a module to support assembly/disas-
sembly of the protocol 6LoWPAN. The developed module
is available in the Scapy Community Repository. Several
classes has been developed to create the whole structure of
6LoWPAN packets format. All the classes are inherited from
the scapy packet module except the class SixLoWPANAddr-
Field which represents 6LoWPAN addresses. In 6LoWPAN,
there are several types of packets: Mesh, Broadcast, IPHC,
Uncompressed IPv6 packets and Fragmentations packets.
The main difficulty was to handle fragmentation when
6LoWPAN splits long packets in several successive packets.
When fragment packets appears, we have used two different
handlers for representing them according to their position.
If the packet is the first part of a big packet it is handled by
the LoWPANFragmentationFirst handler and the successor is
handled by the LoWPANFragmentationSubsequent handler.
As 6LoWPAN protocol has a particular encoding
system, there are several fields that has a variable
length depending on other parameters. The module pro-
vides different functions to provide fields length value.
For example: source addr mode, destination addr mode,
pad trafficclass, etc...
In Snippet 5, we provide an example of decoding a
6LoWPAN message. In this example, the packet is pro-
vided in an hexadecimal format assigned to the variable
lowpan frag second. To decode the packet, we need to call
the constructor SixLoWPAN with the variable containing the
packet data as a parameter.
Snippet 5 An example of decoding a 6LoWPAN message
in Scapy.
>>> from scapy.layers.sixlowpan import *






















2) Messages injection: The decoding module is only able
to generate or modify 6LoWPAN packets on the fuzzing
platform running on a host. However, we need a way to
inject packets over 802.15.4 wireless links to be processed
by a target device. We have thus modified Contiki [11]
sources to generate a firmware to be run on an AVR Razor
USB stick. This stick will act as a bridge between the fuzzing
platform and the 6LoWPAN network. It receives packets
generated by the 6LoWPAN module and injects them over
the 802.15.4 wireless interface. The modified version of
Contiki is able to send native 6LoWPAN packets without any
processing, or IPv6 packets that will be then processed and
transformed into 6LoWPAN packets. The injection steps of
a packet through the 802.15.4 bridge are depicted in Figure
3.
Figure 3. The injection of a packet through the 802.15.4 bridge towards
a 6LoWPAN device.
C. Mutation algorithms
Network-fuzz testing implies applying mutations over
messages to corrupt one or multiple values of a specific
message. Our fuzzing engine supports different mutation
algorithms to be applied at different levels.
1) Random bit mutation: This method is the simplest
and trivial one. It takes a pre-built message and applies
corruption using an xor operation to random bits. The cor-
ruption ratio is defined as a parameter provided by the user.
It denotes the percentage of number of bits to be modified
from the total number of bits of a message. The corruption
operation is applied before computing the checksum control.
Otherwise, it is useless and the packet will be rejected
without being processed by the target device.
2) Random field mutation: This method takes as input the
fields of 6LoWPAN headers, selects some of them and in-
serts random values. Let’s take the example of a 6LoWPAN
message with a compressed header. This message has 23
fields. Using a corruption ratio of 0.5, the mutation function
replaces 12 fields with random values using the function
RandVal available in Scapy.
3) Custom mutation: The fuzzing engine provides also
a python interface to write user-defined mutation functions
to be applied on the set of messages defined in the XML
interaction scenario. It is only required to define a python
function which will be called to apply the mutation over
one or more messages. Snippet 6 shows an example of a
user-defined mutation function to be applied on the message
identified as msg to fuzz in the interaction scenario. The
corruption ratio is obtained from the metadata parameter.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our fuzzing tool suite, built on top of the Scapy frame-
work using a decoding layer of 6LoWPAN messages, should
be applied by anyone who regularly performs security
auditing or vulnerability discovery in 6LoWPAN-enabled
networks. An XML based specification has been defined
Snippet 6 An example of a user-defined mutation function to
be applied on a specific message of an interaction scenario.
from scapy.utils import corrupt_bits
def no_op_algorithm(scapy_message, options,
metadata, variables):




to describe fuzzing scenarios against a target device. The
XML scenario contains the set of message to be sent to
the device and their respective responses. The tool provides
mechanisms to inject 6LoWPAN packets through a 802.15.4
embedded driver to arbitrary modify that packets using
random bits or fields mutations. Even, the tool is still at
an early stage, it has been tested to discover vulnerabilities
in a 6LoWPAN implementation provided by the Contiki
project. The fuzzing software is available for public use and
enhancement.
There are many future directions to explore with our
fuzzing tool. Most, immediately, the bridge code should
be extended to support the injection of 802.15.4 messages
without further processing. Removing such limitation, we
will be able to inject modified 802.15.4 frames. We also
have to widely test our fuzzer against multiple 6LoWPAN
implementations. Currently, we have only tested the Contiki
implementation. Other, more challenging, work is possible.
One example is the addition of more complex algorithms
which track and mutate messages over multiple devices to
discover more vulnerabilities. Additional work automating
the fuzzing process is another valuable direction. It is
possible to automate the system through the integration of
solvers for bit-vector constraints [12] to drive the fuzzing
strategy.
A. Availability
This entire tool suite is publicly available licensed
under the LGPL. It can be downloaded at http://http://
sicslowfuzzer.gforge.inria.fr/. Contributions are encouraged.
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